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Abstract
We investigate a toy model of inductive interacting agents aiming to forecast a con-
tinuous, exogenous random variable E. Private information on E is spread heteroge-
neously across agents. Herding turns out to be the preferred forecasting mechanism
when heterogeneity is maximal. However in such conditions aggregating informa-
tion efficiently is hard even in the presence of learning, as the herding ratio rises
significantly above the efficient-market expectation of 1 and remarkably close to the
empirically observed values. We also study how different parameters (interaction
range, learning rate, cost of information and score memory) may affect this scenario
and improve efficiency in the hard phase.
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1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing observations made over the years in financial data
analysis concerns the tendency of financial forecasters to imitate each other.
An account of this phenomenon is found in [1], where earning forecasts from
different markets over a 17 year period are analyzed, showing (among other
results) that: (a) forecasts are typically optimistic, that is the difference be-
tween the forecast and the actual earning is positive on average; and (b) the
spread of forecasts among analysts is significantly smaller on average than the
forecast error, i.e. the typical spread of forecasts around the real earning. In
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other words, analysts' forecasts are more similar to each other than they are
to the variable they are trying to forecast. More recently, a similar data set
has been studied to estimate the fraction of herding analysts [2], with the sur-
prising conclusion that around 75% of the analysts in the data set displayed
a marked tendency to herd as a forecasting strategy. Interestingly, about 10%
of analysts were instead found to be anti-herding. Stock prices in turn tend to
react more strongly to forecasts that differ from the consensus (see e.g. [3] for
a recent study).
While psychological factors like social pressure, reputation issues and (for anti-
herding) a desire for visibility can be crucial in determining this scenario, it
is quite difficult to explain these results within the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH). In the EMH world, one would expect different forecasters to use their
respective partial information to produce a proxy for the target variable that
is unbiased and such that the forecast dispersion and the forecast error are
roughly the same, as would result from forecasters that are independent and
fully heterogeneous with respect to information and forecasting ability.
Different models in the economic literature have addressed the problem of
the origin of herding behavior among financial forecasters in a Bayesian game
theoretic setting (see e.g. [2,4]), proving that if an analyst aims at maximizing
the value of his reputation with investors (or the chances that investors believe
he's a good forecaster) then it may actually be more profitable for him to
replicate other agents' forecasts rather than putting forward a guess based on
his private information. A recent agent-based model proposed by Curty and
Marsili [5] focuses instead on the limits that herding imposes on the efficiency
with which information is aggregated. Specifically, it was shown that when
the fraction of herders in a population of agents increases, the probability
that herding produces the correct forecast (i.e. that individual information
bits are correctly aggregated) undergoes a transition to a state in which either
all herders forecast rightly, or no herder does.
In this note we study a variation on the theme by Curty and Marsili, aiming at
characterizing further the dynamical interplay between learning and hetero-
geneity of information in a population of agents aiming to predict a continuous
exogenous random variable (learning was briefly considered in a discrete fore-
casting setting also in [5]). At each time step, every agent is required to formu-
late a forecast either using his private information or by herding with a group
of peers and selects the strategy to adopt based on his past performance. We
show that the structure of the agents' choices changes significantly depending
on the heterogeneity of information. In particular, herding becomes increas-
ingly preferred by agents as information becomes more and more unevenly
spread across the population. However, the herding coefficient (measured by
the ratio of the forecast error to the forecast dispersion) peaks roughly where
informational inhomogeneity is maximal, implying that learning in such con-
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ditions does not allow for an efficient aggregation of the available information.
The results we discuss are mostly obtained by computer simulations. Deeper
analytical progress (beyond the simple considerations made here) could be
possible either along the lines of [6] or by reasonably simplifying the coupled
herding and learning mechanisms.
2 Model definitions
Following [5,7], we consider a population of agents (labeled i = 1, . . . , N) who
have to forecast at each time step t = 1, 2, . . . , a continuous random variable
E drawn independently at each t from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. The
forecast fi(t) of agent i at time t is taken to be correct if |fi(t) − E(t)| < ,
in which case we shall write fi(t) = E(t). In what follows, the resolution
parameter  will be fixed to the value 0.1 so as to focus the study on the
remaining parameters. In order to fomulate his forecast, every agent must
choose between using his private information (strategy lebeled p) and herding
(label h). In the former case, agents simply propose a forecast fpi which is
correct with probability pi ≥ 2, initially unknown to i. Note that 2 is the
probability with which a random uniform guess in [0, 1] is within  from E,
hence we are assuming that the private information has better-than-random
predictive power. Larger values of pi correspond to higher forecasting abilities.
We assume, along the lines of [5], that the pi's are sampled independently from
`(p) = β(1− 2)−β(1− p)β−1 , p ∈ [2, 1] (1)
Tuning β one passes from a situation in which almost all agents are well
informed (small β), to one in which almost all agents have no forecasting
ability (large β); as β increases, the information heterogeneity (or the a pri-
ori forecasting ability) reaches a maximum when β = 1, corresponding to a
uniform distribution. We shall denote by p the average value of pi, given by
p = (1 + 2β)/(β + 1).
When herding, an agent uses instead a prediction fhi (t) obtained by pooling
a group Pi of K peers chosen randomly and uniformly for each i (our results
do not appear to depend significantly on K as long as K is not extensive; we
shall use K = 10 here). This represents, in analogy with e.g. [8], the contact
network of the agent. Our choice for a plain Erdös-Renyi topology parallels
that made in [5], but results are expected to change if different topologies are
employed. The herding forecast is defined as the fixed point of the iterative
process
fhi (n+ 1) =
fhi (n) +
∑
j∈Gi(t) fj(n)
|Gi(t)|+ 1 (2)
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with Gi(t) = {j ∈ Pi : fpi (t) =d fpj (t)}. In words, at time step t every agent
only interacts with his peers whose initial (private) guess is sufficiently close,
within a range measured by d, to his [7]. The effective interaction range
is a crucial parameter to model social interaction and has proved to play a
non trivial role in other contexts [9,10]. Note that the number |Gi(t)| of such
peers is obviously bounded by K but it fluctuates in time; furthermore, in the
above sum fj(n) denotes the forecast of agent j who may be herding (in which
case fj changes with n) or not (in which case it is fixed to f
p
j ). This defines
a dynamical imitation network onto the contact network, close in spirit to
that defined in [8] in the context of Minority Games. In this case, however,
the averaging operation through which herding is performed does not allow
for a straightforward identification of an imitation hierarchy.
As in many other instances of games with learning [11], we take agents to be
inductive: they monitor the performances of their two strategies over time via
scoring functions indexed by g ∈ {p, h} that are updated in time according to
U gi (t+ 1)− (1− λ)U gi (t) = pigi (t)− δg (3)
and the agent's chosen strategy gi(t) is selected by a logit rule with learning
rate Γ ≥ 0:
Prob{gi(t) = g} = e
ΓUgi (t)
eΓU
p
i (t) + eΓU
h
i (t)
, g ∈ {p, h} (4)
The different parameters appearing above have all been introduced and dis-
cussed at length in the context of Minority Games and related models (see
e.g. [12] for a broad review). In the present case, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 denotes a memory
length parameter, roughly corresponding to the inverse of the time scale over
which agents preserve a memory of the past performance of their strategies.
δp,h denote instead the cost (or the incentive) faced by each player to get his
private information or to herd. pip,hi (t) denotes the profit faced by agent i at
time step t. For the sake of simplicity, we reward agents who guess correctly
with one point, while we take one point from agents who guessed incorrectly.
Finally, Γ is a parameter that encodes for a tunable stochasticity in the agents'
choice rules, with deterministic behavior recovered for Γ → ∞. Note that at
every time step both the strategy scores of every agent are updated.
Starting from initial conditions U gi (0) = 0, we are interested in observing the
steady state behavior of the following quantities:
• The herding probability, measured by the time-averaged fraction of herders:
Fh =
〈
1
N
∑
i
δgi(t),h
〉
t
(5)
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• The probability of success of strategy h (averaged over time and agents):
q =
〈∑
i δgi(t),h χ(f
h
i (t) = E)∑
i δgi(t),h
〉
t
(6)
where χ(A) = 1 if the event A is true, and zero otherwise
• The time- and agent-averaged forecast error:
Σ =
〈
1
N
∑
i
(fi(t)− E(t))2
〉
t
(7)
• The time-averaged forecast dispersion:
σ =
〈
1
N
∑
i
(fi(t)− f¯(t))2
〉
t
(8)
• The herding ratio φ = Σ/σ
The way in which agents produce their forecasts, and as a consequence the
herding ratio will be affected by all of the above parameters but, most im-
portantly, will depend on the information heterogeneity, measured by β. Note
that φ ≥ 1. We remind, finally, that, under the EMH, Σ ' σ, so one would
expect φ ' 1.
3 Results
3.1 The simplest case
We begin by analyzing the case in which every agent consults all his peer
group (d = 1 or Gi(t) = Pi for all times), has infinite score memory (λ = 0)
and learning rate (Γ = ∞, corresponding to a deterministic choice rule) and
faces no costs (or receives no incentives) to use his strategies (δh = δp = 0).
This will be used as a reference situation to evaluate the impact of the above
parameters on the game. Fig. 1 shows the average herding success probability
q as well as the fraction of herders Fh as a function of β. We see that when
agents are well informed (β small) herding outperforms the private information
strategy and the majority of agents correctly learn to herd to increase their
success probability well above p. For large β, on the other hand, when agents
have limited predictive ability, they learn to use their private signal as it
slightly outperforms the herding forecast. This behavior, including the decay
of q that is observed for large β (q → 2 as β → ∞) essentially parallels
that observed in [5]. The behavior of Fh, by contrast, displays a sharp drop
as informational heterogeneity increases beyond the point where, as is clear
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Fig. 1. Probability q of successful herding versus β. Markers denote results for indi-
vidual samples; the continuous line stands for the average. Left inset: p (dashed line)
and q (continuous line) versus β. Right inset: Fh versus β. Simulation parameters:
N = 1000, K = 10,  = 0.1.
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Fig. 2. Sample-to-sample variance of Fh versus β for different values of N . Simulation
parameters:K = 10,  = 0.1. The dashed vertical line marks the position of β? = 5/3
in this case.
from the inset, the private signal outperforms herding. Note that for large
β sample-to-sample fluctuations become larger and larger as p ' q, so that
realizations with many herders (up to a 70% fraction of the population) coexist
with realizations with few herders (less than 10%). It is worthwhile to inspect
the dependence of sample-to-sample fluctuations on β more closely, see Fig.
2. Besides the increase for large β, a sharp peak (roughly independent of
the system size) appears for intermediate β, marking a qualitative change
in the game's macroscopic properties. Again, this signals a strong sample-
dependence of the fraction of herders and occurs when the payoffs of the
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Fig. 3. Inverse herding ratio 1/φ versus β. Inset: Σ (continuous line) and σ (dashed
line) versus β. Simulation parameters: N = 1000,K = 10,  = 0.1.
two strategies become comparable. Such an effect is absent in the one-shot
game and is induced by learning. Note that the fraction of herders for β's
close the the peak is consistent with the results of [2]. In turn, the herding
ratio displays the behavior shown in Fig. 3. One observes a sharp minimum
in 1/φ around β ∼ 1, where it attains a value consistent with that found
empirically in [1,2], where φ ∼ 5. Away from this crossover region (where,
we remind, information heterogeneity is maximal), φ is instead closer to the
EMH limit φ ∼ 1. This suggests that inductive agents indeed manage to
aggregate information quite efficiently when it is distributed uniformly across
them, regardless of the quality of the information. This process is no longer
possible in presence of a more diversified information landscape.
A naive analytical estimate of the value of β where the game undergoes a
crossover can be obtained by arguing as in [5]. Denoting by pi the probability
of a correct forecast, one has
pi = Fhq + (1− Fh)p¯ (9)
where q denotes the probability of a correct forecast by herding. Neglecting
both the learning and the herding dynamics, q is given by the probability that
the majority of the peer group members have a correct forecast, i.e.
q =
K+1∑
g=K/2+1
(
K + 1
g
)
pig(1− pi)K+1−g (10)
A qualitative change is expected to occur when p = q = pi. One easily sees
from (10) that this condition is satisfied (besides the trivial solutions pi = 0
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or pi = 1) when pi = 1/2, implying
β? =
1
1− 4 (11)
For  = 0.1 the prediction β? = 5/3 agrees well with the numerical experi-
ments. Eq. (11) also characterizes the role of the resolution parameter: as 
increases, the number of effective alternative states of the variable E (given
by 1/(2)) decreases and β? becomes larger, extending the range of effective-
ness of herding as a forecasting strategy. (The fact that  cannot exceed 1/4
was implicit in the model's definition.)
Note that the naïve guess for the fraction of herders given by [5]
Fh =
∫ p¯
2
`(p)dp = 1−
(
β
1 + β
)β
(12)
according to which agents with pi < p are assumed to herd asymptotically,
does not produce the correct results in the present model, suggesting that the
specific forms of Fh and of its fluctuations, including the large β increase, are
likely due to the learning dynamics itself.
3.2 Role of the parameters Γ, λ, δh, δp and d
We now focus our analysis on the additional model parameters described in
Sec. 2. For the sake of simplicity, we will study one of them at a time as
variations of the basic case investigated above. Figures 4 and 5 show specif-
ically how the fraction of herders and the herding ratio change when these
parameters are varied for different values of β.
Starting with λ ∈ [0, 1], which as said above introduces a finite memory of
past scores (for λ = 0 there is no loss of memory while for λ > 0 the score is
exponentially discounted in time with a characteristic time given by 1/λ, see
[13] for a solvable model that highlights its role in the context of Minority-
like Games), we see both Fh and φ are essentially insensitive to λ except
in the critical region where informational heterogeneity is maximal. In this
case, a larger λ (or a shorter memory) leads to a decrease of both Fh and
φ, implying that a finite memory may lead closer to the rational aggregation
of the available information when the latter is distributed in a highly in-
homogeneous way.
Similar conclusions can be reached by analyzing the learning rate Γ that tunes
the amount of stochasticity in agents' choice. Its impact appears to be most
remarkable close to β = 1, when a (small) degree of randomness in the strategy
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Fig. 4. Fraction of herders Fh versus (λ, d,Γ, δ = δp − δh) for β = 0.1 (triangles),
β = 1 (circles) and β = 3 (squares). Simulation parameters: N = 500,K = 10,
 = 0.1.
selection process helps to reduce the fraction of herders and hence to bring φ
closer to the rational value of 1.
The role of parameter d ∈ [0, 1] in the context of opinion dynamics models
has been discussed e.g. in [7]. It takes into account the chance that people
may prefer to interact, and possibly accept to adjust their beliefs, only with
opinions not too far from their initial ones. For d = 1 all opinions in the
peer group are treated equally. For other values of the parameter, instead, the
sum in (2) is restricted only to agents whose forecasts are within d from each
agent's initial choice. It is interesting to note that when herding represents the
best strategy, i.e. around β = 1, the fraction of herders is almost insensitive
to different values of d (which possibly suggests also a weak dependence of
the results on K). Nevertheless reducing d the herding ratio appears to get
smaller, indicating that a more rational aggregation of information may occur.
By contrast, for larger β agents may be unable to identify p as the most likely
successful strategy if d is too small.
Coming finally to the incentives δh, δp (which are known to have a far from
trivial impact on Minority Games, see e.g. [14]), we focus on the dependence
of Fh on the parameter δ = δp − δh, which is easily understood to be the
relevant quantity in this case. As to be expected, incentives to herding, or
higher costs for using the private signal, shift agents towards the h strategy,
and lead to an increase of φ (and vice versa for incentives to the p strategy).
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Fig. 5. Inverse herding ratio 1/φ versus (λ, d,Γ, δ = δp − δh) for β = 0.1 (triangles),
β = 1 (circles) and β = 3 (squares). Simulation parameters: N = 500,K = 10,
 = 0.1.
This crossover appears to be smooth only when β is sufficiently large. For
smaller β it sharpens and one observes a steep jump at δ = 0 in both Fh and φ,
reminiscent of similar effects induced by incentives or Tobin taxes in Minority
Games [14,15]. In this case, agents appear to polarize on the herding strategy
as soon as a small incentive is available, leading to disastrous consequences
for φ and suggesting the existence of a first-order transition in δ (though a
more refined numerical analysis would be needed to clarify this point). The
qualitative outlook is however essentially unchanged with respect to the the
case of larger β's.
4 Conclusions
We have studied here a simple forecasting game with inductive agents who
must formulate a forecast by either using their private information or by herd-
ing with a group of peers. The quality of the information at an agent's dis-
posal is measured by the a priori predictive ability of his private signal, and
we investigate how the game's overall properties are affected by increasing in-
formational heterogeneity in the population. Our main result is that inductive
agents may be unable to produce rational forecasts when the heterogeneity
is large. In this situation, the herding ratio becomes significantly larger than
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one, taking on values similar to those measured empirically in the financial
literature [1,2]. We have also observed that the efficacy of herding depends
strongly on the distribution of information. The role of several parameters
of interest in the context of games with inductive agents has finally bee an-
alyzed. Generically speaking, a finite learning rate, a shorter memory or a
smaller interaction range may all contribute to reduce the herding ratio when
the informational heterogeneity is large.
The interest in forecasting games is based on the fact that they present a
simple outlook and a rich phenomenology that allows to shed some light on
the process of information aggregation and its limits. It is however difficult
to establish a direct contact between these toy models and financial markets,
which still represent the main source of empirical data. One possible step in
this direction that is worth exploring would consist in coupling the event to
be forecasted, E here, with the agents' choices, as done for example in [16].
E would play in these models the role of a `price'. Depending on the form of
the payoff one would then observe a dynamical feedback between learning and
`price' leading to a rich outlook possibly similar to that studied in Minority
Games.
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